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ARGUMENT 
Young's Appellee Brief hinges on three arguments. First, Young incorrectly 
argues that the statute of limitations on Dr. Jensen's legal malpractice claim tolled at the 
very latest on April 21, 2003, which is four years after the trial court in the underlying 
matter dismissed Dr. Jensen's defamation claims on summary judgment. Second, Young 
argues in the alternative that no attorney-client relationship existed between Jensen and 
Young prior to the tolling of the statute of limitations on the First Broadcast, which was 
on September 5, 1996 ("First Broadcast"). Rather, Young asserts that an attorney-client 
relationship did not exist until April 9, 1997 when the parties entered into a written 
retainer agreement. Third, because the Supreme Court in Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 
325 (Utah 2005), dismissed Dr. Jensen's award for punitive damages relating to what the 
Court called the "least defensible" Third Broadcast, the punitive damages allocated to the 
First and Second Broadcasts must also be dismissed. 
With respect to Young's first point, the discovery rule applies to toll Jensen's legal 
malpractice claims where Jensen had no reason to believe he had been injured by 
Young's malpractice until nearly two years after the expiration of the original statute of 
limitations. The facts support Jensen's reasonable belief because not only did the trial 
court allow Jensen to amend the compliant to plead false light, it also denied KTVX's 
motion for summary judgment to dismiss the false light claim, and Jensen went on to 
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receive a $2,800,900.00 jury verdict. Second, more than sufficient conflicting evidence 
exists to preclude judgment as a matter of law that no attorney-client relationship existed 
between Jensen and Young prior to the running of the statute of limitations for the First 
Broadcast. Moreover, even accepting Young's position as true, Jensen was still owed a 
duty by Young based on the relationship formed during their first meeting, which took 
place a few weeks after the First Broadcast. Finally, based on its own standard articulated 
in the underlying Jensen v. Sawyers case, the Court must conduct an independent review 
of the record which is not before the Court because that record has not been incorporated 
into the Jensen v. Young record, before it can dismiss punitive damages relating to the 
first two broadcasts. Additionally, sufficient evidence exists in the Jensen v. Sawyers 
record to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of actual malice with respect to the 
two broadcasts. 
A. BASED ON THE UNIQUE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE DISCOVERY 
RULE APPLIES TO TOLL JENSEN'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS. 
If there ever was a situation for the discovery rule to apply in a legal malpractice 
case, the unique facts and circumstances of Jensen's legal malpractice claims certainly 
warrant its application to promote justice and prevent severely undue hardship. 
This is not a situation where Jensen knew that Young's malpractice had fatally damaged 
his claims before the original statute of limitations expired, yet he simply chose not to 
pursue a cause of action against Young until after missing the four year statute of 
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limitations. Rather, Jensen reasonably believed that Young's malpractice had been 
remedied. Moreover, unlike the fact pattern in Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1998), no one, especially not Young, ever advised Jensen of the statute of limitations on a 
legal malpractice claim. 
1. Jensen Reasonably Believed Young's Malpractice Had Been Remedied. 
When evaluating the application of the discovery rule in this case, it is critical to 
look at the situation from Jensen's perspective. Young cites to the portion of the 
Williams case which states that the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim 
"begins to run upon the occurrence of the last event required to form the elements of the 
cause of action." Id. at 1284; (Aple's Br. at p. 23.) Young argues that at the very latest, 
the "last event" to form the elements of Jensen's cause of action occurred on April 22, 
1999 when the defamation claims were dismissed in the underlying Jensen v. Sawyers 
case. (Aple's Br. at p. 24.) Young also argues that the special circumstances exception of 
the discovery rule is "reserved 'for more egregious circumstances.'" (Aple's Br. at p. 25.) 
Young correctly states that the special circumstances exception of the discovery 
rule can only be applied where the aggrieved party did not and could not have discovered 
the claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and it would be "truly 
'irrational' or 'unjust' to apply a statute of limitations." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline 
Co., 70 P.3d 1, 17 (Utah 2003). The reason for cautiously applying the discovery rule to 
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toll a statute of limitations is that "liberal tolling could potentially cause greater hardships 
than it would ultimately relieve." Id. 
Young's myopic argument ignores the three pivotal facts in this case which clearly 
demonstrate that application of the ordinary statute of limitations is truly irrational and 
unjust, thereby mandating application of the special circumstances exception of the 
discovery rule. First, on April 22, 1999, the same day Jensen's defamation claims were 
dismissed, the trial court allowed Jensen to amend his complaint to plead an alternative 
theory of false light invasion of privacy. (R. 345-44, If 20-21.) Second, after the 
complaint was amended, the trial court denied KTVX's motion for summary judgment 
seeking dismissal of these amended claims, including that for false light invasion of 
privacy. (R. 344, f 21.) Third, Jensen did not know of the extent of his damages until 
November 15, 2005 when this Court issued its ruling in the underlying matter wherein 
Jensen's jury verdict was reduced by nearly $2,395,900.00. (R. 323, If 143.) 
Prior to April 21, 2003, which is the latest date Young argues the legal malpractice 
claim could lave been timely filed, Jensen had one trial court ruling allowing him to 
amend his defamation claims to false light invasion of privacy (R. 345-44, fflf 19-20) and 
a second trial court ruling denying KTVX's motion for summary judgment dismissing the 
amended false light claims. (R. 344,121.) Not only did Jensen have the two trial court 
rulings upholding the amended false light claims, but he also had a 2001 jury award in 
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excess of $2,800,900.00. (R. 344, If 22.) With a multi-million dollar jury verdict in hand 
nearly two years before Young argues the statute of limitations expired, Jensen did not 
have the slightest reason to believe he had been injured by Young's malpractice before 
the statute of limitations expired. 
Young's brief recites statements from Jensen's former attorney, Dale Gardiner, in 
attempt to establish that Jensen knew the extent of his damages before the original statute 
of limitations expired. (Aple's Br. at pp. 16-17.) Young claims that because Gardiner 
billed Jensen $14,228.23 in legal fees, that he had sustained requisite damage to provide 
Jensen sufficient notice of his legal malpractice cause of action. (Aple's Br. at pp. 16, 
20-21.) Young improperly uses the testimony from Gardiner in an attempt to establish 
Jensen knew he had been damaged by Young before April 21, 2003. (Aple's Br. at pp. 
16-17, 20-21.) Clearly, Gardiner's testimony is not evidence of Jensen's state of mind 
and the argument ignores the three trial court rulings which formed the foundation for 
Jensen's reasonable belief that he was uninjured by Young's malpractice. 
More importantly, Young's arguments ignore Jensen's own statements that he did 
not believe he had been injured by Young's malpractice until after the Supreme Court 
overturned the false light claims on November 15, 2005. In his deposition, Jensen states 
that at the point his defamation claims were dismissed, he did not know if he was injured 
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by the dismissal of the claims (R. 248) and that it was his belief that his attorneys were 
working to perform "damage control." (R. 248-47.) 
From Jensen's perspective, the damage control performed by his attorneys was in 
fact, extremely successful. Prior to April 21, 2003, two trial court rulings told Jensen that 
his lawsuit against KTVX had not been injured due to Young's malpractice. Jensen 
further believed he was uninjured by Young after the amended claims led to a nearly 
$3,000,000.00 jury verdict. Moreover, Jensen's damages were incapable of being 
measured until the Supreme Court decision was issued in the underlying Jensen v. 
Sawyers case. Based upon the unique fact pattern in this case, along with notions of 
justice and rationality, the discovery rule should be applied to toll the legal malpractice 
statute of limitations until November 15, 2005 when this Court overturned Jensen's 2001 
jury verdict. 
2. No One Ever Advised Jensen of the Statute of Limitations on a Legal 
Malpractice Claim, 
Young argues that because Jensen had discussed a possible legal malpractice 
claim against Young with other attorneys as early as 1997, Jensen knew of his damage 
before the running of the original four year statute of limitations. (Aple's Br. at p. 27.) 
While Jensen knew Young had committed malpractice, he did not believe he had been 
irreparably injured by Young's failure to timely file the Complaint. 
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Young told Jensen that he failed to file a timely complaint relating to the 
defamation claims associated with the First and Second Broadcasts. (R. 516-14, 441.) 
However, at the time Young revealed his malfeasance, he simultaneously downplayed his 
failure to timely file by leading Jensen to believe that his case was primarily based on 
claims of fraud and therefore, his defamation claims were essentially unnecessary. (R. 
473, 441.) Clearly, the advice provided by Young regarding Jensen's lost defamation 
claims, at best, obscured the severity of any potential injury. 
Ultimately, a lay client cannot reasonably be expected to know of a possible 
malpractice tort when the professional minimizes its existence because "professional 
malpractice law does not charge a layperson with the knowledge of a professional and 
does not foster such distrust of our profession." Brown v. Behles & Davis, 135 N.M. 
180, 184 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). An attorney has a fundamental obligation to 
communicate important information to his client and explain matters to the extent 
necessary so that the client can make informed decisions. UTAH R. PROF. COND. 1.4(b). 
Important information undoubtedly includes communicating to the client when the 
attorney commits malpractice, if the attorney has knowledge of the malpractice. As a 
professional, the attorney has a duty to fully inform the client of the existence of a 
possible injury. See UTAH R. PROF. COND. 1.4(b). 
A review of the Williams case provides a stark contrast between that attorney's 
communication with his client after missing a statute of limitations and the lack of 
communication from Young to Jensen. The attorney in the Williams case, Mr. Jackson 
Howard, failed to file a notice with a governmental entity before the one-year statutory 
deadline expired. See Williams, 970 P.2d at 1284. Eleven days after Howard discovered 
the mistake, he met with the client to account for the mistake and to tell the client that his 
cause of action was most likely barred by the statutory deadline. Id One week later, the 
client also received a letter in which Howard again acknowledged the mistake and 
"accepted responsibility for any loss that [Williams] sustained by reason of [Howard's] 
failure..." Id. The attorney stated that "'to the extent that Springville City should be 
liable' to Williams, Howard was similarly liable." Id. Howard also advised the client of a 
potential conflict of interest in retaining him to represent the client in any other causes of 
action that had not expired, and he recommended the client take the letter to another 
attorney for independent legal advice concerning the matter. Id 
Unlike the attorney in Williams, Young did not advise Jensen that as a result of his 
failure to file a timely Complaint, Jensen may not be able to recover anything from 
KTVX. (R. 520-19, 473, 441.) Young did not memorialize this failure in writing, nor did 
he explain that to the extent that KTVX would have been liable for damages Young was 
similarly liable. (R. 520-19, 473, 441.) Young continued to represent Jensen for nearly 
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two years after he missed the statute of limitations on the defamation claims (R. 521) 
despite the potential conflict of interest. Young never suggested that Jensen seek 
independent legal advice regarding the matter. (R. 521-19, 473, 441.) Rather, Young 
downplayed the importance of the defamation claim and focused Jensen on the fraud 
claim as the cause of action central to his recovery against KTVX. (R. 516-14, 473, 441.) 
Even when the defamation, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims were dismissed 
on summary judgment in the underlying matter (R. 375, 345-44,120), Jensen did not 
have any reason to discover the malpractice cause of action because his attorneys were 
simultaneously allowed to amend Jensen's complaint to plead the alternative false light 
invasion of privacy cause of action. (R. 344-43, ^ f 20.) 
Young points to the fact that Jensen discussed a legal malpractice claim against 
Young with various attorneys including his former counsel, Dale Gardiner in an effort to 
show that Jensen knew of his injury long before the original statute of limitations ran. 
(Aple's Br. at pp. 16-17, 28.) However, Young's argument ignores the fact that none of 
these attorneys, especially not Young, notified Jensen of the four year statute of 
limitations associated with a legal malpractice claim. 
Ultimately, Jensen could not have reasonably been made aware of the legal 
malpractice causes of action against Young due to the trial court allowing the defamation 
claims to be amended to false light. As such, the foregoing provides an additional, 
unique circumstance for applying the discovery rule. 
B. YOUNG'S ARGUMENT THAT JENSEN COULD HAVE EITHER 
OBTAINED A TOLLING AGREEMENT OR A MOTION TO STAY 
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS BASED UPON PURE SPECULATION AND 
IGNORES THE FACT THAT JENSEN DID NOT KNOW THE EXTENT 
OF HIS INJURIES. 
Young argues that Jensen had two other options that would have allowed Jensen to 
file his legal malpractice claim before the original statute of limitations expired on April 
21, 2003. The first option would have been for Jensen to enter into a tolling agreement 
with Young whereby Young would have voluntarily agreed to toll the statute of 
limitations until the Supreme Court decided the Jensen v. Sawyers case. (Aple's Br. at p. 
36.) The second proposed option would have been for Jensen to file his malpractice case 
against Young and then obtain an order from the trial court staying the action pending a 
final decision in the Jensen v. Sawyers case. (Id.) 
While Jensen theoretically could have asked for a tolling agreement, the likelihood 
of Young agreeing to such a request is purely speculative. There is nothing in the record 
to suggest that Young would have voluntarily entered a tolling agreement. Moreover, 
based on the facts available to all the parties prior to the November 15, 2005 Supreme 
Court decision, Jensen did not have any non-speculative injury. 
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Young also suggests that Jensen could have filed a complaint against Young and 
then obtained a motion to stay proceedings until the appellate process in the underlying 
case was complete. (Aple's Br. at p. 36.) The assertion that a court would have agreed to 
a motion to stay is similarly, based on mere speculation. A court could have just as 
likely denied a potential motion to stay, leaving Jensen without the ability to assert the 
true measure of his damages as they were unquantifiable prior to November 15, 2005. 
Furthermore, alternatives suggested by Young ignore the fact that Jensen did not 
believe he had been injured by Young's malpractice, therefore did not think a tolling 
agreement or a lawsuit was necessary. Jensen could not have known that he would be 
damaged in the amount of $2,395,900.00 any time before the Court's November 15, 2005 
decision in Jensen v. Young. 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HOLD THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NO 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN JENSEN 
AND YOUNG PRIOR TO THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FOR THE FIRST BROADCAST BECAUSE SUFFICIENT 
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE EXISTS AS TO THE FORMATION OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP AND BECAUSE, EVEN ACCEPTING YOUNG'S 
POSITION AS TRUE, YOUNG STILL OWED JENSEN A DUTY BASED 
ON THEIR FIRST MEETING. 
Summary judgment on the grounds that Jensen and Young had not formed at least 
an implied attorney-client relationship prior to the running of the statute of limitations for 
the First Broadcast is inappropriate. During Jensen's first meeting with Young, Young 
provided sufficient legal advice to establish an express, or at the very least an implied 
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attorney-client relationship so that Young owed a duty to Jensen. Summary judgment is 
likewise improper because the record contains sufficient conflicting evidence as to 
whether an attorney-client relationship formed that the question should be left to a jury. 
See Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978). 
1. An Express Attorney-Client Relationship Was Formed Between Jensen 
and Young Because Legal Advice Was Sought and Given to An Extent 
That Young Owed Duties to Jensen. 
Contact between an attorney and an individual seeking legal advice does not have 
to be extensive to form an attorney-client relationship. Indeed, Utah courts have held that 
summary judgment based on the lack of an attorney-client relationship was inappropriate 
in a case where contact between the attorney and the client was minimal. See Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(holding that summary 
judgment was inappropriate in a case where the attorney had been hired by a party 
potentially adverse to plaintiff, and plaintiff had never met with attorney prior to the 
transaction giving rise to the malpractice). The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also 
create a duty to provide competent legal advice even to a potential client—someone who 
has merely sought the attorney's advice: "[a] lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." See UTAH R. 
PROF. CONDa 1.1. Other courts have also held that a limited attorney-client relationship 
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forms simply from an initial client meeting where the attorney renders an opinion as to 
the merits of the case, regardless of whether the client is able to retain the attorney. See 
Togstad v. Miller, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980)(per curiam). Therefore, because Jensen 
sought legal advice regarding his claim against KTVX and Mary Sawyers, and Young 
rendered legal advice regarding that claim, an express attorney-client relationship formed 
such that summary judgment is inappropriate. 
The duty to render competent legal advice when sought is sufficient to establish a 
limited attorney-client relationship, even if the attorney is not formally retained. Togstad, 
291 N.W.2d at 693. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that an attorney had 
committed malpractice when he advised a potential client that she did not have a good 
medical malpractice claim, and failed to inform her of the two year statute of limitations. 
Id. The Court found that because the plaintiff "sought and received legal advice under 
circumstances which made it reasonably foreseeable to [the attorney] that [the plaintiff] 
would be injured if the advice was negligently given," that an attorney-client relationship 
had formed, Id. The court found that the attorney was negligent in failing to act 
competently in investigating the merits of the claim, Id., similar to what the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct require, and that he was further negligent in failing to inform the 
plaintiff of the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 694. Therefore, although the 
attorney never agreed to take the case, he still owed a duty to the plaintiff to provide 
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competent legal advice with respect to the merits of her claim and the statute of 
limitations. The existence of the duty essentially established a limited attorney-client 
relationship with respect to the duty. 
In the present case, Jensen and Young's relationship was much more extensive 
than that in Togstad. Similar to the plaintiff in Togstad, Jensen sought legal advice 
concerning a potential claim that faced a short statute of limitations, and he was given 
initial advice by way of Young confirming that he had a good case, that was potentially 
worth a lot of money. (R. 488-87.) However, unlike in Togstad, Young did not merely 
decline to tale the case or advise Jensen that his case was weak. Instead, Young 
expressed interest in the case. (R. 297-96.) He told Jensen that the case was strong and 
further attempted to advertise his services to Jensen by discussing his success in previous 
cases. (R. 294-93.) Nevertheless, he stated his desire to wait to begin work on the case 
until after the DOPL investigation (R. 297-96), despite the fact that there was a one year 
statute of limitations, of which he did not inform Jensen. (R. 295.) Young did in fact 
appear as Jensen's counsel after the conclusion of the DOPL investigation. (R. 194.) The 
sole reason for the delay of the execution of the written retention agreement was Young's 
desire to wait until Jensen was finished with the DOPL investigation. (R. 483-82, 297-
96.) Unlike the attorney in Togstad, Young was familiar with defamation cases, and 
should have known of the statue of limitations. Jensen relied to his detriment on Young's 
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advice to wait until after the DOPL investigation to pursue the case, therefore meeting the 
Togstad standard. 
Certainly, if the court in Togstad could find a limited relationship and a duty to 
give competent legal advice when an attorney declines to take a case, this Court should 
find that a relationship exists when an attorney shows interest in a case, attempts to offer 
his services, and then delays work on the case pending the outcome of a potentially 
lengthy administrative investigation even when he knows of a short statute of limitations 
for the potential claim. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct establish a duty to act 
competently when giving advice in this type of situation. That duty essentially creates a 
limited attorney-client relationship with respect to the advice rendered, or the advice that 
should have been rendered during Jensen and Young's first meeting with respect to the 
statute of limitations and the potential problems with delaying action—advice that should 
have been rendered whether or not Young was inclined to accept the case. Certainly, a 
reasonable jury could find, based on this duty, that a relationship was formed between 
Jensen and Young. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
2. The Record Provides Sufficient Evidence That An Implied Attorney-
Client Relationship Was Formed Before The Statute of Limitations 
Ran on The First Broadcast, Such That Summary Judgment Would Be 
Improper. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate because there is sufficient evidence to 
establish a material issue of fact as to an implied attorney-client relationship between 
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Jensen and Young. The central question in deciding whether an implied attorney-client 
relationship existed is whether Jensen reasonably believed, prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations for the first broadcast, that he was represented by Young, based on 
Young's conduct toward Jensen. Breuer-Harrison, 799 P.2d at 727. The Court must look 
to Young's actions or inactions, and Jensen's reasonable interpretation of those actions 
with respect to the relationship. The record provides enough evidence that a jury could 
find that Jensen reasonably believed Young to be his attorney at the time that the statute 
of limitations ran on the first broadcast, even though it also contains evidence to the 
contrary. Because summary judgment is improper where conflicting evidence exists as to 
the formation of an attorney-client relationship, this Court should not grant summary 
judgment based on the lack of an attorney-client relationship in this case. See Sorenson, 
585 P.2d at 460 (holding that, in malpractice cases, summary judgment should only be 
granted due to lack of attorney-client relationships "when all the facts entitling the 
moving party to a judgment are clearly established or admitted"). 
In Bieuer-Harrison, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether an attorney-
client relationship existed between the buyer of property and the attorney, hired by the 
seller, who aided in closing the sale. In reversing summary judgment for the attorney, the 
court noted that the establishment of an attorney-client relationship is based largely on 
the subjective belief of the client. Id at 727. However, that relationship must be 
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"reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the attorney." Id. In other words, 
the client's belief must be reasonable. Id. at 728. Therefore, the Court must look both to 
Jensen's subjective belief as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship, along with 
Young's representations and actions that induced that belief. 
The Court of Appeals in Breuer-Harrison, examined the facts upon which the 
plaintiff based his belief that he was represented. That evidence came almost entirely 
from deposition testimony. Id. at 729. The court found that the plaintiff had no contact 
with the attorney prior to the closing of the property sale, and that the plaintiff had also 
sought to hire an additional attorney to check the validity of the title. Id. Nevertheless, the 
court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the plaintiff testified that 
"he thought [the attorney] was acting as his attorney," IcL This, combined with the type of 
documents that the attorney prepared, created sufficient disputed material facts to 
preclude summary judgment. Id. at 729. Bruer-Harrison is in keeping with Sorenson, 
supra, where this Court found that, because of a "conflict in the evidence presented by the 
depositions of the parties as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed," summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 585 P.2d at 460. Therefore, where there is conflicting 
evidence as to the formation of an attorney-client relationship, summary judgment is 
precluded. 
17 
Young's argument that Jensen never believed that he was represented by Young 
until after the statute of limitations had run on the first broadcast is premised entirely on 
one letter written by Jensen on February 6, 1997, after the statute of limitations had run, 
which stated "I realize you have not yet taken this case." (Aple's Br. at pp. 39-45.) 
However, this letter alone is insufficient to justify a grant of summary judgment for 
Young because the record contains conflicting evidence as to Jensen's reasonable belief 
that he was represented by Young. Jensen's letter to Young was written shortly after 
Jensen received a letter from Young requesting information on the outcome of the DOPL 
investigation and stating that Young would then decide whether to take the case. (R. 203, 
200-198.) Both letters were written after the statute of limitations had run for the first 
claim. (R. 230, 198.) Therefore, it is entirely plausible that Jensen understood Young to 
be his attorney earlier in their relationship, prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations, and that Young's letter served to put Jensen on notice that Young did not 
recognize the relationship. Indeed, this is in keeping with Jensen's testimony that as early 
as their first meeting, he considered Young to be his attorney. (R. 288-87.) 
Evidence supporting Jensen's reasonable belief that an attorney-client relationship 
existed also includes that Young and Jensen had an extensive discussion of the case 
shortly after the First Broadcast. (R. 297, 294-93.) In that meeting, they discussed the 
merits of the case, the timing of the broadcast, and whether Young believed Jensen had a 
18 
good case. (R. 297, 294-93.) Young told Jensen that he liked the case, and that he 
wanted to pursue it, but that he would have to wait until after the DOPL investigation had 
concluded. (R. 297-96.) After the broadcast, Jensen periodically contacted Young. He 
provided him a copy of the Second and Third Broadcasts. (R. 289.) He testified that he 
considered himself "in touch" with Young. (R. 654.) Indeed, it is probable that Young 
also recognized the relationship, as he did nothing to suggest to Jensen that there was no 
relationship, even when Jensen continued to provide Young with information involving 
his case. Similar to the plaintiff in Breuer-Harrison, Jensen testified that from the time of 
their first meeting, he believed Young to be his attorney. (R. 288-87.) Jensen's 
relationship with Young was more substantial than the relationship between the attorney 
and plaintiff in Breuer-Harrison, where the attorney had been hired by another party, and 
the plaintiff had never met with the attorney. These facts are sufficient for a jury to find 
that Jensen reasonably believed Young was his attorney, and therefore, summary 
judgment based on the lack of an attorney-client relationship would be inappropriate, 
even considering the conflicting evidence argued by Young. 
Young's additional argument that Jensen did not believe that an attorney-client 
relationship existed between himself and Young because he discussed his case with other 
lawyers is also not dispositive. It is merely evidence that a jury should weigh against the 
evidence that Jensen did reasonably believe that a relationship existed. Interpreting these 
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facts in Jensen's favor, as this Court is required to do when determining judgment as a 
matter of law, the fact that Jensen discussed the case with other attorneys does not negate 
Jensen and Young's relationship. Simply because Jensen sought a second opinion as to 
his case, as he testified in his deposition (R. 652), does not nullify his relationship with 
Young, or Young's duty to provide competent legal advice. 
Because there are sufficient conflicting issues of material fact as to whether Jensen 
reasonably believed that he had formed an attorney-client relationship with Young, 
summary judgment on these grounds is inappropriate. 
D. ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT, 
AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE RECORD MUST BE 
UNDERTAKEN BEFORE PUNITIVE DAMAGES RELATING TO THE 
FIRST AND SECOND BROADCAST CAN BE DISMISSED. 
Young's argument that this Court should enter judgment, as a matter of law, on 
Jensen's claim for punitive damages as to the First and Second Broadcasts is based on 
this Court's conclusion that there was no actual malice in the Third Broadcast, and that 
the Third Broadcast was "the least defensible of the three." Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 
at 346-37. However, this Court's decision as to the Third Broadcast was based on its 
independent review of the record in Jensen v. Sawyers. Here, the Court is unable to 
review the record in the instant case because the record in Jensen v. Sawyers is not part of 
this case's record on appeal. Based on the standard of independent review of the record, 
dismissal of the punitive damages flowing from the first two broadcasts based solely on 
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the Court's finding of the lack of actual malice with respect to the Third Broadcast in 
Jensen v. Sawyers is inappropriate. 
In Jensen v. Sawyers, the Utah Supreme Court applied the standard articulated in 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), to justify an independent review 
of the record to determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence of actual 
malice. Jensen, 130 P.3d at 347. Although the Court found no evidence of actual malice 
with respect to the Third Broadcast, it is illogical and mistaken to automatically assume 
that, even assuming the Third Broadcast was the "least defensible of the three 
[broadcasts]," the Court could find a lack of actual malice with respect to the First and 
Second Broadcasts without performing the requisite review of the underlying record. 
While the traditional standard for examining a trial court's findings of fact is the 
"clearly erroneous" standard, appellate courts will give somewhat less credence to the 
trial court in situations where constitutional rights—in this case, First Amendment 
rights—are at issue. Bose 466 U.S. at 499-500, see also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 
284 (1971). In those cases, appellate courts are not bound by the factual findings of the 
trial court, and should "re-examine the evidentiary basis on which [the trial court's] 
conclusions are founded." Time, 401 U.S. at 284. Nevertheless, Bose makes clear that 
"due regard" must be given to the trial judge's opportunity to observe the demeanor of 
the witnesses and other facts when making an independent factual determination. Bose, 
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466 U.S. at 499-500. The standard set forth in Bose requires the Court to make an 
independent analysis of the record to determine whether actual malice existed. 466 U.S. 
at 499. 
In this case, the record the Court must examine is that of Jensen v. Sawyers. In 
rendering its opinion in Jensen v. Sawyers, the Court did not make an independent review 
of the record to determine whether it could find sufficient evidence of actual malice with 
respect to the first two broadcasts so as to support the jury's award of punitive damages, 
where the claims relating to the first two broadcasts were dismissed in their entirety based 
on their vulnerability to the one-year defamation statute of limitations. Jensen, 130 P.3d 
at 337. This Court clearly stated that it did not conduct the requisite independent review 
of the record with respect to the first two broadcasts, stating: 
In spite of our impression that the third broadcast was likely the least 
defensible of the three, we conclude that its content does not reveal 
actual malice and therefore we vacate the award of punitive damages. 
Id 130 P.3d at 346-347, (emphasis added). 
The Court's "impression" regarding what was "likely" with respect to the 
defensibility of the Third Broadcast compared to the first two is not a holding based on an 
independent review of the first two broadcasts. Based on the need to conduct an 
independent review of the record, and the fact that the appropriate record to be reviewed 
is not before the Court, the Court is, at this point, unable to make the requisite 
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independent review of the record to make a determination as to the punitive damages for 
the First and Second Broadcasts under the standard articulated in Bose. Young's 
suggestion that the Court can make this finding simply based on its finding that the Third 
Broadcast showed no actual malice is improper and falls far short of the standard 
articulated in Bose. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests this Court to reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment and find that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of 
limitations on Jensen's malpractice claim until the date of this Court's 2005 decision in 
Jensen v. Sawyers. Jensen also requests that the Court find that sufficient conflicting 
material issues of fact exist to render judgment as a matter of law with respect to the 
formation of an attorney-client relationship inappropriate. Finally, Jensen requests the 
Court delay addressing the issue relating to the punitive damages flowing from the First 
and Second Broadcasts as premature where the Court is not in a position to conduct an 
independent review of the record. 
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